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Abstract 
 
 
At the end of WWII Germany had to face a difficult situation posed by a military occupation over its territory 
and by a division into four zones. At the basis of that complete loss of authority for Germany, there is a 
written agreement that formalized the surrender, also known as Unconditional Surrender. From a juridical 
point of view, the Unconditional Surrender is a special category of capitulation which leaves open the 
possibility for the victorious powers of adding further provisions. The case of German Prisoners of War in 
the U.S. sector (1945-1947) is to be considered and analyzed in the light of the above-mentioned legal 
framework.    
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Introduction 
 
The twentieth century was a turning-point in the world’s history: two World Wars and a Cold War. The First 
World War was a catastrophe with no parallel in history; it introduced new kinds of fighting and it didn’t spare 
innocent civilians. In that period nine million soldiers died in the trenches. Armies invaded countries and slaughtered 
people. The Second World War systematized this trend. The German Army deported Jewish people and created a 
huge world of internment camps. In 1943, Allied powers introduced a terrible air raid practice that hit all German 
cities. Escape of millions and millions of civilians was another consequence of this new kind of war.  The First World 
War not only started a new sort of fighting, but also changed the background of captivity and its perception. Also the 
number of prisoners changed and increased: Stephen Ambrose and Günter Bishof wrote that during the Second 
World War “some thirty-five million prisoners of war were taken worldwide” (Ambrose and Bishof 1992, 2).  
 
Until the Second World War diplomatic efforts gave a serious contribution to the processing of special 
agreements such as Geneva Convention 1929, which dealt with disarmed soldiers’ destiny. These agreements were 
more and more generous towards prisoners of war, but after 1945, when the war was over, something changed: the 
behaviour towards prisoners gradually lost transparency standards. During the Second World War Geneva 
Convention 1929 represented the main legal reference; after 1945 this agreement was no longer valid because the 
Third Reich had surrendered: Geneva Convention 1929 hadn’t taken an unconditional surrender into account. So, as 
international rules were changing, what was the fate of German prisoners of war after the Second World War? 
 
Status of Prisoners of War and Transient Camps 
 
The situation of German prisoners of war in Russia is not very relevant in this context: U.S.S.R. had never 
signed Geneva Convention, so it always treated prisoners of war in the same way: that is badly. France had signed 
Geneva Convention, but it had few prisoners of war in its hands in comparison with other countries. In his 1998 
study, François Cochetadded that “l’essentiel des prisonniers de guerre en mains françaisesvient non pas des captures 
directeseffectuées par l’Armée de la libérationmais de cessions auxquellesontprocédé les Anglo-Américains” (Cochet 
1998, 121). In this case great powers were the United States of America and Great Britain: after 1945 they had 
together more than five million German prisoners of war in Europe. But they hadn’t expected a number like that. So 
they decided to invent a new class of prisoners of war: that is DEFs, disarmed enemy forces.  
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This category was quite disadvantaged: DEFs were not well nourished and not well housed and sheltered. 
The reason of this decision was to save resources. So, after 1945, two classes of prisoners of war lived together: 
POWs, that is prisoners of war, and DEFs, that is disarmed enemy forces. The former status, with normal rights, was 
granted to German prisoners who had surrendered before 8 may 1945; the latter status was assigned to German 
prisoners who had surrendered after 8may 1945. An exchange of letters within Supreme Headquarters of Allied 
Expeditionary Forces stated 
 
Please confirm that when no large numbers of Allied PWs remain in German hands, any further Germans 
surrendering can be treated as capitulated troops and not as PW (7 May 1945, in Z 45F-Z 46, Office of Military 
Government for Germany, RG 260, Bundesarchiv Koblenz) 
 
The answer: 
 
It would appear to have a practical rather than a legal basis; under the Geneva Convention such action cannot 
be taken until surrender or formal capitulation by proclamation. However, the “Unconditional Surrender of 
Germany” absolves the three Allied Powers from declaring any or all personnel of German Armed Forces to be 
POWs (7 May 1945, in Z 45F-Z 46, Office of Military Government for Germany, RG 260, Bundesarchiv Koblenz) 
 
In his 1982 study, the jurist Wilfried Fiedler wrote about the “Unconditional Surrender of Germany”: 
 
The traditional meaning of the term “unconditional surrender” was lost at the end of World War II due to the 
use of certain “instruments of surrender” without any new, clear, legal categories first being established. The term 
“general capitulation” remains less problematical. General capitulation goes beyond the traditional meaning of 
unconditional surrender since it can include the capitulation of the entire armed force or of essential parts of it. The 
meaning in the sense of the termination of war is equally distinct from the traditional one; an overlapping with 
armistice here is obvious. Although certain links, particularly military ones, still exist between a “simple” general 
capitulation and the traditional meaning, State practice at the end of World War II exhibited with unconditional 
surrender a special form of general capitulation with has little connection to the legal concepts hitherto developed. 
 
The unconditional surrender of the German High Command has to be regarded as being in a special category, 
owing its elaborate preparation at the highest political levels during World War II. Characteristically, capitulation in 
this instance was regarded as a method of terminating hostilities with regard to the entire military forces of a 
belligerent at the highest level of military command. Thus, contrary to the meaning hitherto given to the term in 
international law, capitulation referred solely to acts of military surrender, while at the same time leaving open the 
possibility of adding further provisions. The documents of surrender explicitly stated:  
 
“This act of military surrender is without prejudice to, and will be superseded by any general instrument of 
surrender imposed by, or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to Germany and the German armed forces 
as a whole” (Fiedler 1982, 237). 
 
The U.S. Army assigned these two categories (POW and DEF) to German prisoners of war, but, at the same 
time, it tried to feed, as much as possible, even German disarmed enemy forces and (it tried) to ease living conditions 
in their camps. The conclusion is that, in this case, practice was different from theory: that is DEFs should have been 
treated badly, but in reality their conditions were not so different from POWs’ conditions. This was essentially due to 
the sense of honour and the moral code of the U.S. Army.  
 
However, even if the U.S. Army avoided, in practice, to discriminate too much between POWs and DEFs, at 
the beginning of the occupation of Germany it couldn’t avoid a very bad period for all German prisoners in its hands: 
in April 1945, shortly before the unconditional surrender, U.S. Army founded about twenty transient camps along the 
Rhine River, especially along its left side. These camps gathered German prisoners of war captured during the first 
months of American penetration into Germany and straight after the surrender. They were transient camps, destined 
to be dismantled in September 1945. In these camps prisoners had to be recognized, identified and carefully screened. 
After that German prisoners were sent to other camps, generally permanent. The problem is that transient camps 
along the Rhine River were completely unorganized, lacking in shelter, beds, food… Indeed Eisenhower’s orders on 
17 April 1945 were categorical: 
 
Transient enclosures established in Germany for handling enemy prisoners of war will be so operated as to 
accord the most adequate care and maintenance possible in existing emergencies. Transient enclosures may be so 
operated and established by advance sections at any point in Germany.  
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In all cases the greatest practical advantage will be taken of existing facilities. Insofar as practical, transient 
enclosures will be located within the permanent zone of US occupation. Preference will be given to locations on the 
east side of the Rhine River. The capacity and location of such enclosures and the number of them will be 
determinated by the section commander concerned and will depend upon the estimated load of prisoners.  
 
Each such enclosure will always be designated as “Prisoner of War Temporary Enclosure” (abbreviated 
PWTE) and will be numbered by the section commander concerned. Prompt report of each enclosure established will 
be made to this headquarters by giving number of the enclosure, its location, by coordinates, by naming the nearest 
small town and the nearest large town, its present capacity and its full capacity with the date when full capacity is 
expected to be reached. When possible, the nearest airfield will be designated.  
 
No entry into transient enclosures will be permitted except upon pass signed by the section commander. All prisoners 
of war will be screened as soon as possible after arrival at a transient enclosure. The screening is to determine those 
who are eligible for prisoner of war status. Primarily, this is intended to eliminate civilians, who will be released (17 
April 1945, in Z 45F-Z 46, Office of Military Government for Germany, RG 260, Bundesarchiv Koblenz) 
 
Living conditions in these camps were very very difficult and precarious and they openly broke instructions of 
Geneva Convention 1929. Actually prisoners in transient camps were compelled to be pressed-up within enclosures, 
without shelter. They usually dug big holes in the ground to protect themselves from bad weather. In this situation it 
was very hard to sleep. Besides, food also lacked and prisoners sometimes ate what they found in the ground. They 
hoped to receive help from people outside the camp, but food lacked for everybody, prisoners and civil population. In 
Germany transient camps were well-known as “complaint camps” because of bad conditions inside. They were also 
famous as Rheinwiesenlager, that is meadow camps. The only furniture of these enclosures, apart from wire fences and 
barbed wire, were overlooking watchtowers. This situation of extreme discomfort and hardships was confirmed by 
document sources of the International Committee of the Red Cross, who visited some of these transient camps in 
spring 1945. We can read an excerpt from a visit report dated 14 may 1945 of International Committee of the Red 
Cross about Heilbronn camp:  
 
Il n’existaitqu’unegrande prairie à cet emplacement avant la date d’ouverture du camp, et les 
Autoritésn’ontbénéficié que de la proximitéd’une station de chemin de fer et d’un certain nombre de 
bȃtissessituéesautour de cette station, utilisées par les bureaux, les magasins et les troupes de gardeaméricaines. Le sol 
des “cages” estactuellementdépouillé de toute vegetation, c’est un terrain vague, brun rouge, poussiéreux, argilleux à 
50 cm de la surface, de sort que, lorsqu’ilpleut, il se transformeenmarécage. La plupart des prisonnierscouchent sur le 
sol etmanquent de tentes et de couvertures. Durant les quelquesjours de pluie du moisd’avril, la situation étaitdevenue 
critique et les prisonniers ne pouvant plus mȇmecoucher par terre. Les officiers de plus de 50 ans et 
certainsofficiersmalades ne peuvent continuer à coucher sur un terrain humideou supporter les intempéries sans 
qu’ilendécoule de graves conséquences pour leurétat de santé (14 May 1945, PWTE camp/ Heilbronn C.1, in Service 
des camps, zone U.S., Allemagne-1945, Comité International de la Croix-Rouge) 
 
In Germany spring 1945 was very cold and rainy and that made living conditions in these camps worse. It was 
not a case of a real intent to harm by the U.S. Army: Americans didn’t plan a disaster like that, but mess before and 
after surrender and the situation of legal anarchy in Germany made a degeneration of this kind possible. We cannot 
forget that, after 8 may 1945, Germany no longer existed as a state entity and so it couldn’t protect its prisoners of 
war. In his 1951 study, Kurt Launstated that “the Dönitz government was not recognized because its effectiveness 
was said no longer to exist” (Laun 1951, 267). 
 
But on the other hand, we cannot explain the disaster of transient camps only on the basis of bad 
organization: in this first phase of occupation Allied powers had just discovered and personally visited nazi 
concentration camps and gas chambers. So there was no way of avoiding a sense of hostility and horror towards all 
was German.  It was not a case of real vengeance, but of inevitable feeling and inevitable negative mood towards all 
was German.   
 
Conclusions 
 
Transient camps were dismantled in September 1945 once and for all. In the following autumn were founded 
permanents camps, where prisoners previously identified and screened were gathered. Permanent camps, set up in 
Bayern, Württemberg-Baden and Hessen, were well organized and fit to lodge and receive prisoners of war.  
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Here they could sleep, eat and amuse themselves with sport or intellectual activities in leisure time, in 
accordance with Geneva Convention 1929. These camps were the result of a better stabilization of American 
presence, especially of a full consolidation of power by American Military Government in Germany. But permanent 
camps were also the result of a new political deal. We cannot forget that in the space of short time, because of Cold 
War, coalitions were changing and old enemies were becoming partners.  
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